Coercing to persuade

The ever-well-read Wired "Danger Room" blog writes a little post on how artillery has been used to pave the way for talks with local sheiks in the Diyala province of Iraq. This is an aspect of persuasion that has always interested me. At times you need to use violence (a definite no-no in all rhetorical thinking, ancient and modern) as a pretext for being able to persuade and having a constructive debate.

I'm not studied enough on Clausewitz but this aspect of warfare is either an affirmation or a qualification of his famous (and over-used) dictum: War is the continuation of politics.

In the modernist interpretation (where I think we should place C. himself), this meant that war took over when politics had exhausted it's role. In the post-modern interpretation, it means that war is just politics by other means. And this last interpretation is very much in tune with the thoughts about warfare in the fourth generation warfare, new wars, etc. As the classical concept of states warring each other for power crumbles to something much more messy and sub-statey, this mixture of warfare and persuasion will take on prominence. Not that it is a new genre. In a way you could see the proxy wars of the Cold War era as an aspect of same persuasion: "Look how much destruction we can rain down on you, when you attack me. Care to have a chat about our mutual future?"

Danish political micromanagement in action

It now seems that the Danish military will get to keep one of two types of cluster bombs that it owns, after a debate in the Danish Parliament, Folketinget. Cluster bombs have been the symbol of careless militarism and indifference towards civilians, as they have a tendency to leave some of their submunitions unexploded, for kids and others in the war zone to pick up. Recently the pension funds in Denmark were revealed to invest in companies that make this still popular weapon that is used to destroy vehicles, small buildings - and other people of course. Most of them quickly relocated their money and made sure to publicly announce that move.

Now the Military gets to keep its munitions despite a Norwegian report that claims that 10% of even the best bombs leave unexploded submunitions.

But it comes at a price. A broad range of parties have agreed to vote for the deal, under the condition that the government informs them whenever the clusterbombs are to be used. Please replay that scenario on your inner screen.

With this piece of deal-making, the parties have tried to tackle a touchy, symbolic weapons system by submitting it to parliamentary oversight. And as Denmark allegedly never has used cluster bombs in live missions, it seems to be a safe symbolic action to take for all involved parties, showing themselves as concerned, yet responsible.

But deals like this introduces a strange, delusional relationship between military and politicians. In effect, politicians are put in charge of tactical decisions. This is not a new phenomenon. During the Vietnam War, President Johnson and his staff were picking out targets in the air raids of "Operations Rolling Thunder" against North Vietnam. They did this because they wanted to avoid greater political repercussions and because aerial photos made it seemingly easy to ring a building or two on the map.

However, politicians can't and shouldn't make tactical decisions like that, even though they might have political repercussions. For the Military's sake and for their own sake. If the Danish Parliament ever had to sanction the use of the bombs, they shouldbe faced with the detailed explanation and defence of the decision afterwards. This would give politicians a more visible symbolic hand in actual conflict. But I think it would be too easy to push the responsibility down the line blaming the commanders or the people pushing the button, and then the gesture of parliamentary oversight would be truly delusional.

The decision is made tomorrow in the Folketing

Danish UAV lost - in East Africa

The 14th of March the Danish Admiral's Office sent out a brief press statement, telling that "Today the Navy chose to send home two persons from the Ocean Patrol Vessel THETIS after they against standing directives had flown an observation drone over land".

The drone crashed somewhere "10 kilometres northeast of Mombasa".

The THETIS participates in the UN programme running aid to Somalia. The site Danish Naval History had speculated why it had been sent off without its complementary Lynx helicopter that it usually carries on its normal tasks in the North Atlantic, but perhaps carrying the drones is a cheaper and more manageable solution so far from normal waters of patrol.

To me, this is a curious story of the Danish Defence's ongoing and troubled affair with UAV's. After having to scrap the entire Sperwer programme, the Raven was purchased on 11th September last year. I guess the reasoning would go: "We couldn't get the complicated stuff to work, lets buy something that is "plug-and-play", portable in a backpack".

It seems that this strategy has really worked. With my knowledge, the incident is probably just a sign of eagerness recklessness with an excited crew. But despite the Navy's tradition for being less formal than the Army, it is still a bit surprising that an expensive system (over 165.000 DKK total) like that is lost in a bout of afternoon fun. The operators must either have been very careless or lost control over the drone, as the stated range is just about 10 KMs. This also questions its usefulness on a naval ship at sea, I would hold, having a very limited range and flying-time.

Malignant persons would also point out the Diplomatic implications of Danish units conducting surveillance of Kenyan territory - but it doesn't seem that this side of the story has had any traction in public circulation so far.

Here's a map of the surroundings.

View Larger Map

The mysterious Israeli Airstrike: Revisited

Last year, Israeli airplanes hit a target inside Syria - and the expected fuss over that incident, didn't materialise. This has led people to speculate that it was a nuclear facility, but not much is know.

Now, the New Yorker provides us with some quality journalism in digging deep into the story and revealing some of the contradictions that other media (and most of us bloggers) have raced past.

An interesting aspect of the article is how much information can be found in Open Sources and with some dedicated effort turned into usable intelligence.

Whatever was under construction, with North Korean help, it apparently had little to do with agriculture?or with nuclear reactors?but much to do with Syria?s defense posture, and its military relationship with North Korea. And that, perhaps, was enough to silence the Syrian government after the September 6th bombing.

A Strike in the Dark. What did Israel bomb in Syria? by Seymour M. Hersh

Sådan diskuterer man sikkerhedspolitik

En rapport fra DIMS, udgivet i sidste måned, har fundet vej til mit skrivebord nu. Og det ser overordentligt interessant ud. Grundlæggende prøver den at undersøge hvordan den nye aktivistiske sikkerhedspolitik bliver skabt i Folketinget - og påpeger hvor den praksis bliver fundet for let.

Den tilgang til emnet rammer lige ned i mit interessefelt mellem kommunikation og sikkerhedspolitik og konklusionerne ser i høj grad ud til at være i samklang med de ting jeg selv stødte på under interviews og research i den danske brug af InfoOps. Det ser ud som om debatten på Borgen halter bag efter de strategiske realiteter. Men på den anden side er dette den oplagte konklusion for enhver sikkerhedspolitiske observatør, der ikke selv har valgkredsen i klemme i dag-til-dag realpolitik.

Under alle omstændigheder er det rart at se, at DIMS'en bidrager til den forsvarspolitiske forskning på anderledes
"bløde" faconer.

Vibeke Schou Tjalve og Anders Henriksen: Vi diskuterer jo ikke politik på den måde: Regeringen, Folketinget og sikkerhedspolitikken

Fra abstract:

Den nye aktivistiske og brede danske sikkerhedspolitik stiller krav til den måde, hvorpå sikkerhedspolitikken koordineres og debatteres i det danske Folketing. Den nye sikkerhedspolitik fordrer, at man på en og samme tid gør det muligt både at centralisere og demokratisere den parlamentariske praksis. Og til det formål bør de danske politikere grundlæggende ændre deres parlamentariske kultur på Christiansborg.

OSINT and social software

Now the Canadian Forces warns their soldiers about using social software as this constitute a major source of the "enemy's" intelligence. Brig.-Gen. Peter Atkinson estimates that as much as 80 percent of their intelligence comes from the net.

This percentage has set off some fury over at Enthropic Memes, disputing the claim. And to me it also seems that the good Brigadier General is just regurgitating one of the most widespread OSINT memes, namely that 80 percent of all intelligence is gleaned from open sources. This is the type of information that can be thrown around without anyone actually bothering about finding a source. It might very well be true, but it comes off as if the Social Software and the internet has changed this from the days of the public library, and I don't think that's the case.

I think there is some validity to the claim, but on the other hand, the internet has also strengthened some aspects of Counter Terrorism, so you loose some, you win some.

Go home! But where?

The political discussion in Denmark has taken a turn at discussing condemning Islamic fundamentalism. This happens after the recent spat of car-burnings by boys mainly of Arab background, the revealed murder plot directed against one of the cartoonists of Cartoon-Crisis fame and the ensuing flare of Cartoon-crisis 2.0.

Hizb ut Tahrir took the centre stage of this discussion after a protest march where they once again publicly stated their anti-democratic intention.

This spurred the age old question: Why have you come to Denmark, why don't you just go home? This time it was asked by among others the Minister for Justice Lene Espersen in a debate on TV2.

I think the question, when asked in connection to Moslems of a radical salafist leaning is misunderstood.

It implies that the countries that these people come from would be a better place to be if you fight for the Caliphate, the world-spanning empire, uniting the Moslem umma.

But the essence is that these guys believe in an utopia, a place that isn't there. This is in many aspects the most powerful appeal of their movement: "We want to recreate a time of glory and justice and piousness". In this aspect Hizb ut Tahrir is similar to other totalitarianism's dreams of the Tausendjähriges Reich or World Socialism. Of course a moslem country would be more permissive of some aspects of salafist dogma (such as incoorporating elements of Shaaria laws), but very often the political climate of these countries will be much more harsh for these organisations. And then it becomes obvious why you'd rather be in Denmark than in Syria. If you aim after utopia, your post address matters less and rationality of course will have you settle in the most permissive climate.

I don't support the idea that the organisation should be banned. It is radical and radicalizing, but as long as they are under special scrutiny, those views are better kept in the public and not chased further underground.

But that the Justice Minister can wonder why they just don't go home, hints that her understanding of the nature of utopian organisations lacks somewhat and I doubt she would have many reservations outlawing them.

New publications with a Danish view

The Royal Danish Defence College is publishing a new series of briefs - probably in the effort of "scientificing" the organisation. There is a number of interesting subjects, The Taliban's Information Warfare written by RDDC's mr. INFOOPS Thomas Nissen, if of particular interest to me.